I came across this article by Matt Flannagan criticizing a recent article by Jerry Coyne about secular morality (thanks to Jeffery Jay Lowder at the Secular Outpost). Coyne seems to want to make two distinct points: One, that atheists have a well-developed moral sense and thus you don’t need God to be a good person; and two, that morality cannot come from God. Flannagan makes some good observations about the relevance of the distinction between having a moral sense and being under a genuine moral obligation and shows that Coyne doesn’t always acknowledge this distinction. However, Flannagan himself is guilty of misunderstanding Coyne’s argument about the Euthyphro dilemma and he wants to downplay some of the serious problems that the dilemma creates for God-based moral theories. I’ll quote the relevant portion of Flannagan’s article:
The only time Coyne is remotely on point is when he argues that if moral obligations are constituted by God’s commands then morality becomes arbitrary; anything at all could be deemed ‘right’ as long as God has commanded it – even stealing or infanticide. Coyne suggests this argument is devastating and has known to be so by philosophers for hundreds of years.
In fact, since Adams’ publication, this argument has been subject to extensive criticism in the philosophical literature. So much so that today even Adams’ leading critics grant that it fails. Adams contended that moral obligations are, in fact, the commands of a loving and just God; therefore, it is possible for infanticide or theft to be right only if a fully informed, loving and just person could command things like infanticide and stealing. The assumption that this is possible seems dubious. The very reason Coyne cites examples such as infanticide and theft is because he considers them to be paradigms of conduct that no morally good person could ever knowingly entertain or endorse.
Coyne seems vaguely aware of the response, stating “Of course, you can argue that God would never sanction something like that because he’s a completely moral being, but then you’re still using some idea of morality that is independent of God.” Here he again falls into confusion. What his response shows is that people can have ideas about and recognise what counts as loving and just independently of their beliefs about God and his commands. Now this is true but this does not show that moral obligations can exist independently of the commands of a loving and just God. Coyne again fails to grasp the basic distinctions involved in discussions of God and morality.
I think Flannagan is wrong in his interpretation of Coyne’s argument. And I know that he is wrong about what Adam’s leading critics say about the validity of the arbitrariness objection that stems from the Euthyprho Dilemma. (One need only consult the work of Michael Martin, Erik Wielenberg, Mark C. Murphy, or even Richard Swinburne, to see that this is so). Regardless of what the academic consensus is, it is fairly easy to show that the arbitrariness objection is very powerful. But first, I want to address Flannagan’s misinterpretation of Coyne’s argument.
Coyne does not make the mistake that Flannagan accuses him of; he is not just saying that in order to judge God’s commands as moral or immoral we would have to have a moral sense that is independent of God. Rather, he is saying that we would need a standard of moral obligation that is independent of God. What Coyne has done is condense a bit of argumentative interaction between the purveyor of the Euthyphro objection and the defender of the divine command theory (DCT). One aspect of the Euthyphro objection is that, if the DCT is true, then morality is arbitrary. If the DCT is true, God can make any action (even something universally regarded as horrendous such as torturing small children) morally right just by commanding that we do it. But this conflicts strongly with our moral intuitions: it seems natural to believe that something as awful as torturing children could not possibly be morally right. But the DCT implies that this action, along with any act that causes unwarranted and horrendous suffering, could possibly be right (Note: the notion of possibility at use here is metaphysical possibility, not epistemic; more on this below.) One divine command theorist response to this is to say that a loving and moral God would never issue commands the require us to needlessly cause people to suffer (this is the response that Coyne mentions).
There are a few problems with this response. The most important (and the one that I think that Coyne had in mind) is that if we are to understand the reply to mean that a moral God would not issue immoral commands, then this in essence capitulates to the Euthyphro objection. That is to say, the response implies that there is a standard of morality that is independent of God against which he and his commands can be judged. But if morality is independent of God, then the DCT is false.
Consider: If God’s commands are the standard of right and wrong, then it makes no sense to say that one of his commands is immoral. Say he commands that every person kills at least one dog in their lifetime just for fun. If his commands establish the moral facts, that, e.g., an action is morally right (or wrong, as the case may be), then his command that we kill a dog establishes that killing dogs is obligatory. And it makes no sense to say that this command is immoral because killing dogs is morally wrong. On the DCT, under this scenario, killing dogs would be morally obligatory, full stop, just because God commanded that we do it. Thus, if the DCT is true, it is logically impossible for God to command us to do something that it would be morally wrong for us to do. The fact that God commanded us to do it establishes that it is morally right. The very important upshot of this for the purposes of the current discussion is that, on the DCT it is a logically necessary fact that every action that God commands us to do is a morally right action.
So now, if we say that God is a morally good being and that therefore he won’t issue immoral commands, we are assuming that there is a standard of morality that is independent of God. For according to what standard are God’s commands to be judged? We just saw that on the DCT, it is logically impossible for God to command us to perform an action that is immoral; but that is just because an action is morally right just in virtue of God’s commanding it. And this means that no matter what commands God issues, including that we kill dogs or torture children, those things would be morally right. So, if we want to say that God won’t issue those kinds of commands because he is moral, then we have to assume some standard, independent of God, according to which an act can be judged as moral or immoral. And this means that we would have to reject the DCT.
This is the point that Coyne was making when he said, “you can argue that God would never sanction something like that because he’s a completely moral being, but then you’re still using some idea of morality that is independent of God.”
Notice that this has nothing to do with appealing to a moral sense that is independent of God. The point is a logical one and does not depend on us having a moral sense or on there actually being genuine moral value. So I think Flannagan just misinterprets the gist of Coyne’s objection in the above quoted passage.
In any event, as Flannagan indicated, the debate does not end here because the divine command theorist may concede the point but still insist that all he needs is that God is all-loving, and he will get the same consequence (or at least one that is close enough); namely that God will not issue commands that require us to cause horrible pain and suffering (or do anything that we all agree would be horrendous). If developed in the appropriate direction, this reply can lead to a fully developed response to the arbitrariness objection. That response goes something like this: “God is necessarily an all-loving being. The commands that he issues flow naturally from his essential nature. Thus it would be impossible for an all-loving being to issue commands to kill, maim, or unjustly harm. So, in fact, it is not possible, on the DCT, that torturing children is morally right because, on the DCT, it is not possible for God to issue a command that we torture children.”
There are two problems with this response. The first problem is that when we are talking about what is metaphysically possible, we are talking about what can happen, not what will happen. So, if I want to know whether it is possible (in the relevant sense) for my friend to jump off of the Empire State building, I need to know only whether he can do it. It is irrelevant to this question whether or not my friend will do it. He may be an unusually content, satisfied, and happy person by nature who has absolutely no inclination toward suicide. I may conclude therefore, that he will not jump from the Empire State building. But it remains the case that he can do it. Similarly, we may know with certainty that an all-loving being will not issue a command to torture children, but, given that he is omnipotent, it remains the case that he can issue such a command. And if he can do it, then it is possible for him to do it. So, it is possible for an all-loving God to command that we torture kids and thus, on the DCT, it is possible that torturing kids is right.
But even if we could somehow respond to this concern, there is still a second problem. This problem stems not from a concern about what it is possible for God to do, but what is possible period. Consider:
The following is possible:
(A) There exists an all-powerful creator that enjoys watching sentient beings suffer.
As I’ve done in the past, let’s call this horrible deity, ‘Asura.’
Given that (A) is possible, the following is also possible:
(T) Asura commands that parents torture their babies.
To translate this into possible world semantics, we’ll say that there is a possible world (call it WA) in which (A) and (T) are true. If the DCT is true, it follows that in WA the following is true:
(O) Torturing babies is morally obligatory for parents.
What all of this means is that it is possible that it is obligatory to torture babies. And it’s important to note that I am not saying that it is epistemically possible, that for all we know torturing babies is obligatory (on the contrary, I think we know that torturing babies is wrong). Rather, I am saying that, if the DCT is true, then it follows that it is metaphysically possible that torturing babies is the right thing to do.
There are two relevant conclusions to draw from this: First, it shows that the arbitrariness objection cannot be answered via the claim that God is necessarily a loving being. Second, it demonstrates once again that the DCT has consequences that are fundamentally contrary to our moral intuitions. We cannot imagine that torturing babies could be right. Torturing babies is wrong everywhere, every time, in all possible worlds. That is to say, torturing babies is necessarily wrong. Since it implies that it is possible for torturing babies to be obligatory, the DCT conflicts strongly with our moral intuitions.
So, contrary to Flannagan’s dismissal of it, the arbitrariness objection to the divine command theory is very much alive.
not not a philosopher 
27 comments
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October 21, 2011 at 9:00 pm
enenennx
Thank you for commenting on the Coyne and Flannagan articles. I am trying to think about these issues and have had difficulty understanding Flannagan’s comments at his blog.
I hope to read Adams’s supporters as well as his critics, which you list.
October 24, 2011 at 1:20 am
samsonsjawbone
I’ve been mulling over your post for the past few minutes. It’s a thoughtful objection, I think, to the ongoing discussion. My objection comes here:
Similarly, we may know with certainty that an all-loving being will not issue a command to torture children, but, given that he is omnipotent, it remains the case that he can issue such a command.
I think this definition of “omnipotent” is lacking. We should all know that “omnipotence” only means the ability to do whatever is logically possible; thus, an “omnipotent” God cannot make 2 + 2 equal 5 or make a rock so heavy he can’t lift it. Similarly, I think the fact that an all-loving God won’t command baby torture DOES mean that he can’t.
Hence:
And if he can do it, then it is possible for him to do it. So, it is possible for an all-loving God to command that we torture kids and thus, on the DCT, it is possible that torturing kids is right.
I disagree, for the reason above.
The first problem is that when we are talking about what is metaphysically possible, we are talking about what can happen, not what will happen.
I think you have a point here, but it may (I’m not certain and would need to think about it more) point to an irreconcilable philosophical gap between believers and non-believers.
I agree that for the reasons you give, it initially appears metaphysically possible for a “God” to condone torture, given any hypothetical “God” selected at random. But I think the actual God that actually exists is one whose character is such that he would not command torture.
The question becomes: if a real God really exists, is it even logical or rational to discuss a universe run by some hypothetical other “God” that doesn’t? (If it’s not clear what I mean, consider: is it rational to contemplate a hypothetical universe in which 2 + 2 equals 5?)
October 24, 2011 at 2:14 am
jbthibodeau
samsonsjawbone (I had to google that)
I’ve been having a very closely related conversation with Matthew Flannagan in the comments to his blog post.
You say,
“We should all know that “omnipotence” only means the ability to do whatever is logically possible; thus, an “omnipotent” God cannot make 2 + 2 equal 5 or make a rock so heavy he can’t lift it. Similarly, I think the fact that an all-loving God won’t command baby torture DOES mean that he can’t.”
Well, I think that we can get into problems using the definition of omnipotence you suggest. First, it is logically possible to command that someone torture a baby. It’s just not possible for God, supposedly. So, this means we have to revise even your suggested definition of omnipotence from ‘can do everything that it is logically possible to do.’ (Since it is logically possible to command torture, but God can’t do it, on your view). Here is one potential new definition:
‘x is omnipotent’ means ‘x can do everything that it is logically possible for him to do.’
This allows us to say that God is omnipotent even thought he can’t command things like torture because commanding torture is not logically possible for him to do. However, the new problem is as follows: Suppose that there exists a being who is essentially weak, who cannot do anything that even a moderately strong human can do. If he is essentially weak, then in every possible world he cannot do these things. But still, he can do everything that it is logically possible for him to do. So, by the above definition, he is omnipotent.
That can’t be right.
So how do we define ‘omnipotence’ such that God is omnipotent even thought he cannot command that we torture children (which is something that even very weak beings, like humans, can do)?
October 28, 2011 at 10:22 pm
Nathaniel
If we define omnipotence as “able to do everything which is logically possible” and we include in our consideration limitations based on the nature of the agent in question, then I am omnipotent. Sure, I can’t fly, shoot laser beams out of my eyes or fart new universes into existence but since those things are logically impossible due to my essential nature, they don’t really count. It is a truism to say that everything CAN do everything which is logically possible for that thing to do. Therefore, that particular definition of omnipotence is ironically impotent. It describes nothing.
Also, I would say that it is entirely possible that god is not all loving. If it is possible that god is not all loving, then it is possible that he could command things which are otherwise universally accepted as evil. There is nothing about the quality of being all-loving which makes it logically necessary for god to possess (although it might be necessary in order for god to be worthy of worship).
The thing is, we are unsure as to the nature of god if he does indeed exist. We have no clear method of determining god’s nature other than speculation. As such, in considering the ramifications of things such as DCT we must consider the consequences of various conceptions of god.
Keep in mind that the existence of an evil god is not contradictory. Imagine a universe where god wants to cause suffering. In fact, it’s not difficult to imagine that this is such a world. Indeed, if this god is all-knowing then they would know the consequences of their actions with perfect accuracy and thus would be able to engineer events which would cause the greatest amount of suffering for the greatest number of people (perfect evil utilitarianism). There is no contradiction in the actions of such a god. This god can, does and commands evil. This, unlike your imagined universe where 2+2=5, would be more like a universe where humans are all blue in color. There is only a contradiction if all possible conceptions of god must be all loving in all possible universes. Sure, you can work “all loving” into the definition of god, but that’s an argument from definition mixed with a bit of no true Scotsman.
October 24, 2011 at 11:29 am
The Divine Command Theory: I’m philosophically sophisticated after all! « Why Evolution Is True
[…] I did know about that one, too, but it’s a mug’s game to argue with Christian apologists on their websites. Now a real philosopher has come along to save me the trouble by explaining in detail what I said in condensed form in my USA Today piece. At his website not just a philosopher, Jason Thibodeau shows pretty definitively that “the Euthyprho objection is robust.” […]
October 24, 2011 at 12:45 pm
Verbose Stoic
“One aspect of the Euthyphro objection is that, if the DCT is true, then morality is arbitrary. If the DCT is true, God can make any action (even something universally regarded as horrendous such as torturing small children) morally right just by commanding that we do it. ”
The big problem here is that that “universally regarded as horrendous” has NOTHING to do with morality being arbitrary, so that’s a red herring if used at all in a discussion of arbitrariness and in fact leads to comments that the objection is more that our sense of morality and moral intuitions deny that these things could possibly be right than an argument over it making morality arbitrary. However, that argument is singularly weak, since if DCT is right — and I don’t think it is; I choose the opposite horn of the dilemma — then we’d simply be WRONG about what it means to be right; what is morally right really would be what God commands us to do no matter what we thought was right, no matter how deeply our intuitions say otherwise. So it’s odd to call a problem something that the theory explicitly would claim as a virtue; that moral rules are independent of our own subjective impressions and whims.
But we do have an issue since we expect moral rules to be objective, following on from what was just said. But if DCT is correct and we have an OBJECTIVE obligation to follow God’s commands, from our perspective we have moral rules that are not in an interesting sense subjective; from our perspective, they are externally and independently defined separate from us and our subjective states. The only objection would be that they are defined relative to God’s subjective state, but if God created the entire universe and set up the rules of it those moral rules would be no more arbitrary than the laws of nature; we’d still have to follow them and act as if they were true.
So, there is an issue with them being arbitrary that we might want to address, but only at the very, very high level. And the level of human action, the arbitrary objection falls away due to our objective obligation and it being determined separately from us. It’s not arbitrary that I follow GOD’S commands, even if those are depedent on God’s decisions.
October 24, 2011 at 2:06 pm
Joel Wheeler
“…what is morally right really would be what God commands us to do no matter what we thought was right, no matter how deeply our intuitions say otherwise.”
Verbose Stoic has touched upon my primary response to the DCT.
It’s my view that while defenders of the DCT believe they are discussing morality, they are actually discussing something more appropriately labeled righteousness.
A righteous God is always righteous, as are his commands. They are not necessarily morally or ethically sound, as morality and ethics are the purview of natural human interaction.
October 24, 2011 at 4:25 pm
Paul Baird
@ Joel Wheeler – please would you expand on that ? It sounds really interesting, righteous rather than morally good.
Thanks.
October 24, 2011 at 4:49 pm
hazur
“We cannot imagine that torturing babies could be right. Torturing babies is wrong everywhere, every time, in all possible worlds.” That seems to indicate that you believe in the existence of an absolute, objective, atemporal morality which includes that rule. I find that, if I may, metaphysically inconsistent (I see this related to Sam Harris criticism to righteous objections to the use of torture, and greatly misinterpreted). I very much agree that torture (on children or grown ups) should be inexcusable, but that is both a choice and a construction and in no way objective.
Oh, other than that great article.:)
October 25, 2011 at 5:03 pm
Flaffer
Joel Wheeler writes: “A righteous God is always righteous, as are his commands. They are not necessarily morally or ethically sound, as morality and ethics are the purview of natural human interaction.”
But then what does “being righteous” come to? Either this is some way to say “morally good” or “morally bad” or it is something else. But what is this something else? Why would it matter whether a God is “righteous” as he commands his flock to torture little Timmy? This just moves the goal post with a bit of “Abracadabra”.
Hazur writes: “That seems to indicate that you believe in the existence of an absolute, objective, atemporal morality which includes that rule.”
This is not true, for the reason one believes that child torture is wrong need in all possible worlds only commits one to believe the reason for this particular moral judgement applies to babies in all possible worlds where babies are being tortured. If babies in a virtual world do not feel pain, then maybe this may not apply (but are they still babies? Or does the concept “torture” apply to them?). But this does not commit one to any universal moral law that applies to all OTHER moral decisions that are made; it is particular only to baby torture.
October 27, 2011 at 8:44 pm
matthew Flannagan
This seems to me to involve two problems:
The first, is that according to classical theism, God exists necessarily, and hence exists in all possible worlds and so the situation you propose is not possible if classical theism is true.
Second, even if God exists contingently, which must DCT theorists would deny, a DCT would not lead to the conclision that (O) is true in WA. The reason is that a DCT does not claim that an action is obligatory of Azura commands it. It claims an action is obligatory if a just and loving God commands it, seeing Azura is not a just and loving God, the conjunction of DCT with T does not entail O.
October 28, 2011 at 9:12 am
jbthibodeau
Matt,
Thanks for the response.
You say,
“according to classical theism, God exists necessarily, and hence exists in all possible worlds and so the situation you propose is not possible if classical theism is true.”
Well, I’m not sure that you are right about this. John Hick wrote a paper (published in the sixties) in which he argued that ‘necessary’ did not mean ‘true in all possible worlds’ to Aquinas. (I can’t remember the name of the paper). Hick distinguishes between factual and metaphysical necessity and argues that the theism of Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas was only committed to factual necessity. To say that God’s existence is factually necessary is to say that God must exist in this world; that it is impossible for the actual world to exist and yet God not exist. But this does not imply that God exists in all possible worlds.
Be that as it may, you are undoubtedly correct that there is a version of theism according to which God’s existence is metaphysically necessary. I obviously disagree with that. But if the theist insists on it, then continued discussion will be difficult since I want to use arguments that begin with the supposition that there is a world in which God does not exist.
But actually theists want to suppose such things as well. William Lane Craig, Paul Copan, and others who defend the moral argument for the existence of God typically use such claims as “If God does not exist, then there are no objective moral truths.” If this is to be more than a trivially necessary truth (given a necessarily false antecedent, this conditional itself is necessarily true), then it seems that it requires the supposition that there is a world in which God does not exist and, in that world, there are no objective moral truths.
“Second, even if God exists contingently, which must DCT theorists would deny, a DCT would not lead to the conclision that (O) is true in WA. The reason is that a DCT does not claim that an action is obligatory of Azura commands it. It claims an action is obligatory if a just and loving God commands it, seeing Azura is not a just and loving God, the conjunction of DCT with T does not entail O.”
This solution would strip the DCT from any logical motivation. To see this, consider the following question: What is the reason for thinking that God’s commands constitute moral obligations?
One reason typically given for believing the DCT is that morality properties are peculiar and cannot come about (or be realized) in a naturalistic universe. So we need an explanation for where moral properties come from and an all-powerful being is a decent candidate. An all-powerful being can do anything (with appropriate caveats) and so it seems reasonable to suppose that he can bring about moral truths (or cause them to be actual, or be their metaphysical foundation, or however you want to say it). So one reason for thinking that God’s commands can constitute moral obligations is that he is all-powerful.
But Asura is at least as powerful as God. I’ll make that even stronger: Since Asura is not essentially evil, there are worlds in which he is all-loving, and thus, in those worlds, he has all of the properties that God has. Thus, if God’s commands can constitute moral obligations in the actual world, the commands of Asura (a being with all of God’s properties) can constitute moral obligations in these alternative worlds.
But if Asura can do it in worlds in which he is all-loving, then he can do it in worlds in which he is all-hating.
The upshot is that the stipulation that only the commands of an all-loving being can be constitutive of moral obligations is unmotivated. To put it simply, what’s love got to do with it?
October 29, 2011 at 3:36 pm
Maryann Spikes
Put in my two cents here: http://ichthus77.blogspot.com/2011/10/answering-jerry-coyne-and-jason.html
October 30, 2011 at 8:49 pm
matthew Flannagan
Jason
Sure Hick wrote that in the 60’s though I think the discussion has moved on, Anselm for example held that God’s existence was logically necessary, and that seems to be the orthodox position today. The most significant point however is that it appears to be the standard position amoungst divine command theorists, and a DCT can be understood as offering an argument to the explanatory advantages of such a conception of God.
To the more substantial comments.
1. You write ”But if the theist insists on it, then continued discussion will be difficult since I want to use arguments that begin with the supposition that there is a world in which God does not exist.” I think this conflates ontological and epistemological necessity, obviously people can and do in philosophy debate about the truth of claims which are if true true in all possible worlds, for example debate over the analysis of knowledge, analysises are obviously necessarily true. But the point is its epistemologically possible for any purported analysis to be false and thats whats supposed in the argument.
2.
This depends on your view of compossibles, on the standard view your correct all compossibles with a false antecedant are trivially true. My understanding of Craig and others however is that they don’t accept the standard view and think there can be substantive compossibles, so their position does not require the supposition of a possible world where God does not exist. What it requires is an epistemologically possible compossible world and a rejection of the standard view of compossibles.
3.
I don’t think this rejoinder accurately portrays the motivation divine command theorists do offer for their theories at all. Take the locus classicus, the position of Robert Adam’s for example argues that moral obligations have certain features that make it plausible to think that obligations are “social requirements” demands one person makes on another and backs up with certian types of social pressure, he then argues that God is the best candidate for the person in question because he has various excellences such as being loving, just, fully informed and so on. John Hare argues for DCT on the basis that a loving and just God would proportion happiness and virtue. Thomas Carson gtets to it by noting the plausibility of an ideal observer theory and then noting that a divine command view escapes the problems typically associated with an ideal observer theoy and lacking has all the strengths of such a view and so on. I don’t know of any theorist who argues for a divine command theory merely because God is omnipotent.
Moreover, the argument that “morality properties are peculiar and cannot come about (or be realized) in a naturalistic universe” is usually based on the fact that moral obligations have certain features which cannot be plausibly identified with natural properties. Not so much as the issue of “where they came from” and DC theorists argue supernatural properties of being commanded by God ( concieved classically) can provide an account of how moral obligations have these properties as well as accounting for the other features of moral obligation.
So I think this response simply misrepresents the motivations divine command theorists actually provide for their position.
October 31, 2011 at 12:30 pm
jbthibodeau
Matt,
I think we need to remember something important about Adams’ position. You say,
Adams, as I understand him, does not believe that his version of DCT is supposed to account for goodness (or virtue, or any of the axiological properties), but only of deontic properties. So Adams can consistently say that God is good and that this his commands will be informed by his goodness. The commands of God, on Adams view, are constrained, and thus are not completely morally arbitrary.
Now, since I have only just met you and have not read much of your work, I don’t know which version of theological voluntarism you hold. But the philosophers I was criticizing, Craig and Copan, hold that God’s nature is the source of all moral properties, deontic and axiological. Such a view cannot non-trivially predicate goodness of God.
So, I am going to set the axiological notions aside (if you think that this is a mistake, you can let me know). What you have left (or what a DCT that purports to be about deontic and axiological properties has left) is that God is all-loving, all-powerful, fully informed, rational, etc. I said in my previous comment that if such a God can be the foundation for morality, then I don’t see why Asura cannot be. The only thing that God has that Asura lacks is omni-benevolence as an essential characteristic. But I don’t see why this matters.
Both Asura and God can give commands. Why is it that the commands of God can constitute moral obligations but the commands of Asura cannot? The only difference is that God is all-loving. But, on the DCT, God’s commands are logically prior to moral properties. Thus, prior to his commands, there are no moral properties. This means that being loving has no moral value prior to God’s commands.
I’ll let Craig and Copan do my work for me. Both argue that in a world without God, there is no moral value; i.e., nothing matters. In a world without God, we still have human consciousness, human happiness, love, devotion, etc. But none of this has moral value if God does not exist because God’s commands are prior to value. Here is Craig (in a debate with Paul Kurrtz):
“So, if theism is false, it’s hard to see what basis remains for the affirmation of objective moral values and, in particular, of the special value of human beings. It’s not at all clear to me why, if theism were false, humanism would be true rather than nihilism.”
So, prior to God’s commands, humanity and all our happiness and so on are just not morally valuable. Thus, it is hard to see why God’s all-loving nature matters one iota when it comes to his purported ability to ground moral value. God’s making love valuable and virtuous, (or that omni-benevolence is an excellence), involves a judgment. But, given the nature of the logical relationship between God and moral value, it is clear that the judgment could have gone another way. In other words, Asura could have made another judgment. Given the logical relationship between value and divine judgment alleged by the DCT, there is nothing wrong with Asura’s judgment. It is just a different judgment that thus establishes a different set of moral values.
October 31, 2011 at 7:28 pm
Matthew Flannagan
Jason
I think your interpretation here is skewed.
First, Craig’s position is not significantly different from Adam’s, he merely popularises it for his non academic audience. Both Craig and Adam’s identify wrongness i.e deontological properties with the commands of a loving and just God. Both go on to account for axiological properties in terms of a kind of Platonism where God is identified with the paradigm of goodness. On neither account do divine commands account for goodness. On both accounts God’s commands are “constrained” so to speak by his nature.
Second, even if Craig’s was different from Adam’s, you’ll note in my article which is the one you criticise above I explicitly mentioned Adam’s.
So, all I see is you attacking a straw man here, I don’t know any divine command theorist today who holds a view that the commands of a merely omniscient and omnipotent God constitutes moral obligations. All of them wether Quinn, Weirenga, Craig, Wrainwright, Plantinga, and so on, hold that God has certain character traits such as being loving and just ( or at least the descriptive core of those traits) essentially.
November 1, 2011 at 11:17 am
jbthibodeau
I think you are wrong about the similarity of Adams’ view and Craig’s. Adams’ view, as I said, is not supposed to account for axiological properties. Craig, on the other hand, does believe that God is the source of all moral value. In the debate with Kurtz that I mentioned earlier, Craig says, “If theism is false, we do not have a sound foundation for morality” and then he explicitly mentions moral value and moral obligation. Again, “God’s own holy and loving nature supplies the absolute standard against which all actions are measured. He is by nature loving, generous, just, faithful, kind, and so forth.” So Craig very clearly indicates that his view is that if God does not exist, there are not axiological properties.
In his article on moral arguments for theism in his book The Vritue of Faith and Other Essays, Adams argues that rightness and wrongness (denotic properties) give us reason to believe in God. So he is using a very different kind of argument from Craig. (Take a look at Mark Murphy’s article on theological voluntarism at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for more on Adams’ view).
So, I am not attacking straw men. I am criticizing Craig. And as I said earlier, I am not familiar enough with your own view to know if you tend more toward Adams’ view or Craig’s. Since you mention Adams in your post, you are correct that I should have assumed that you favor his view.
Now, one of the important consequences of Adams’ view is that morality is not completely dependent on God. Goodness and badness exist independently of him. This, in itself, undermines many versions of the moral argument (most notably that of Craig and Copan). But I think it also undermines Adams’ own version. If there is a God-independent standard of good and bad, then an Ideal Observer theory of ethical rightness and wrongness can be made more plausible.
Well, I’m sure we can get into objections to Ideal Observer Theory, but I would prefer to stay on the topic of whether there are any moral properties (axiological or denotic) that must be independent of God.
November 1, 2011 at 10:10 pm
matthew Flannagan
Jason
Sorry but I think you misunderstand the literature here:
This equivocates, Adam’s divine command theory is not supposed to account axiological properties. So they exist independently of God’s commands. This does not mean they are independent of God per se In Finite and Infinite Goods, however Adam’s identifies axiological properties with God himself, God being a kind of Platonic exemplar of the good. Craig’s view is the same in the Kurtz debate you mention he states that axiological properties depend on God but he does not make them depend on Gods commands, he is clear in the follow up article at the end “This Gruesome of Guests” that he is only identifying obligations with Gods commands. Goodness he thinks of as different to obligations and grounded in God’s nature not his commands. Craig in fact acknowledges Alston as his source, and I believe Adam’s position has a similar trajectory.
Murphy’s article is addressing voluntarism, the claim moral properties depend on Gods will not the claim they depend on God per se. He is correct that Adams does not ground axiological properties in God’s will. But thats different to claiming that Adams does not ground them in God.
Even if this was accurate of Adam’s (which it isn’t) this seems to me mistaken. Adam’s argument is that God’s commands are the best account of moral obligations, so even if goodness is independent of God it does not follow that moral obligations must be. Adam’s argument in particular is that moral obligations are plausibly understood as social requirements, that is demands made by one person on another backed up by certain type of social pressure, so even if goodness is independent of God he thinks moral obligations have features which require that they be based in the demands of some person. His criticisms of an IOT seem to not depend on goodness being dependent on God.
October 31, 2011 at 8:17 pm
Patrick
Flannagan- Could you give me a rough idea of how some might go about demonstrating that God’s traits are essential, in a non question begging way?
I’m only familiar with the arguments of medieval philosophers, which as far as I can tell beg the question by defining God as the greatest possible being, whatever being that might be, and the claiming that greatness entails certain attributes. But the statement that greatness entails those attributes rather than others is question begging, of course.
I’m not familiar with modern swings at this particular pinata.
October 31, 2011 at 8:55 pm
Matthew Flannagan
Patrick what would be wrong with this answer ? Moral obligations are best explained by the commands of a God who has these attributes essentially. Whereas a identifying them with entities that do not have these obligations does not explain the nature of moral obligations as well.
That after all is what the divine command theorist contends, to respond that “there is no reason for thinking God has these attributes” seems in this context to beg the question.
November 1, 2011 at 10:24 pm
Flaffer
Matthew, the Asura (evil God) objection comes in here as well. Asura explains the moral obligation to commit evil acts. Good acts are hangers-on, just as evil acts are hangers-on for a good God. Unless you think that the good God also obligates that we commit evil acts as well? In other words, if a good God obligates good acts but not evil acts, then this is also what Asura does, but Asura obligates evil rather then good.
How could we know what possible world is the actual one?
November 2, 2011 at 6:55 pm
Patrick
Inherent and essential are different.
November 1, 2011 at 11:19 pm
matthew Flannagan
Flaffa,
Actually the (evil god) objection does not work here for the reasons Jason alludes to. Adam’s argument is that the best account of the nature of moral obligations is that they are the commands of a loving and just God.
Now an evil God’s commands is not a plausible account of the nature of moral obligations because its possible for an evil being to command creul and malicous acts, whereas its impossible to be obligated to commit evil acts. On the other hand a loving and just God cannot command acts which are cruel malicous, so the evil God, hypothesis does not explain the phenomena and a loving and just God does.
Your comments suggest you have a different picture in mind, the existence of an evil God can explain our obligatons to do evil. The problem is we do not have obligations do evil, thats a self contradictory notion, so there is no need to explain obligations to do evil as they don’t exist.
November 1, 2011 at 11:52 pm
jbthibodeau
Matt,
I don’t really think I’m wrong about Adams’ view or Craig’s (though you probably have more expertise on the literature than I). I recognize that Adams identifies the Good with God, but I don’t think that this is the same view as Craig’s view that God’s character provides the standard of goodness.
Take (1) God is the good
compare to (2) Everest is the tallest mountain in the world.
(2) obviously is not a necessary truth. There are possible worlds where Everest is not the tallest mountain. By the same token, (1) is not a necessary truth (well, at least it is not obviously one). Thus there are worlds in which the good is not God. This implies that it is possible for the good to exist and yet God not exist. And thus, goodness and God are logically distinct even if, in this world, the Good inheres in God. My point here is that Adams can consistently hold that God is the good and yet also hold that goodness and God are logically distinct, just as being Everest and being the tallest mountain in the world are logically distinct.
Now Craig will deny that there are worlds in which good exists and yet god does not. So he needs a stronger theory than mere identity. His view is that God’s nature provides the ultimate standard of goodness. But this view cannot be right:
Voluntarism about goodness implies that whatever God wills is, by definition good. But this would make God’s goodness a trivial logical necessity. If we think that God is good in a substantive non-trivial sense, then voluntarism cannot be true of axiological properties. I take it you agree with this argument.
But the exact same reasoning applies to a divine character theory of goodness. If God’s character is the standard of goodness, then God’s character is good by definition. And thus God is good only in a trivial sense. Notice also that the divine character account of goodness is not necessarily voluntarist. If God cannot will his own character, then it is not a voluntarist position. Nonetheless, it shares a very relevant similarity to theological voluntarism about obligation: on this view God’s character is prior to goodness just as, on voluntarism, God’s commands are prior to obligations. On Adams’ view, God is not logically prior to goodness; rather the two are identical.
So Craig is committed, whether he likes it or not, to a view of the good that is parallel in the relevant respect to theological voluntarism about obligation.
Maybe that is too strong, Let me put it this way. If Craig believes that God’s character provides the standard for goodness, a natural way to read him is as taking a position on goodness that is parallel to voluntarism. I don’t see how you get the dependency thesis without that. If you think it can be done, I hope you will explain how.
So, ultimately Craig want to say both that God is good (in a substantive sense) and that goodness depends on God. But you can’t have both (at least I don’t see how). Adams wants to say that God is good in substantive sense and you can say this as long as you accept that goodness and God are logically distinct (even if they are factually identical).
February 22, 2012 at 4:45 pm
Jerry Coyne on God and Morality Revisited | MandM
[…] good without God. My critique attracted some attention. Getting commentary from Mary Ann Spikes, Jason Thibodeau, Jeffery Lay Lowder, and Brian Zamulinski. Since the USA today article Coyne has written a […]
January 24, 2013 at 7:53 pm
LINK: Jason B. Thibodeau Comments on Flannagan, Coyne, and Explaining Morality
[…] LINK […]
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