“It doesn’t really assume this. It only assumes that there are worlds in which God does not exist and in which children exist. In such a world, it is still wrong to torture a child. The argument is neutral on the question of whether “Torturing children is wrong” is true in worlds in which children do not exist; and so is neutral on the question of whether moral truths are necessary truths.”
I addressed this in my third objection where I said “I don’t think any theist who accepts that God is the creator and sustainer of all beings other than himself would accept that there is a possible world where people can exist uncreated and unstained by God.”

“They ought to. After all it is possible that Yod exists; that is it is possible that there is a deity who is the all-powerful, all-knowing, contingently all-loving creator and sustainer. Such a deity would not be God, on your account, since God is necessarily all-loving. Surely Yod can create and sustain a world with people.

This constitutes an assertion that a scanerio is possible, but thats whats being disputed, a theist by claiming that all created things ontologically depend on God for their existence seems to be commited to the counterfactual that if God did not exist and sustain the beings in question they would not exist, so again these arguments simply make substantive metaphysical assumptions which Theists would not grant.

[Aside: I don't think Adams actually holds this. The Adams of "A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness" did not. He thinks it is logically possible, for example, for God to command something gratuitously cruel. But if, as you say, God is necessarily all-loving, a world in which the deity commands gratuitous cruelty is a world in which God does not exist.]

Yes, but in his book Finite and Infinite Goods he seems to say he does accept Gods existence is necessary. Though he does not want to rely on this claim dialectically.

“They may hold this, but since there is no valid version of the ontological argument, let alone one that proves the existence of a necessarily all-loving deity, it is an unfounded belief.

That assumes the only reason for saying that if God exists he would have the property of existing necessarily is that the ontological argument is valid. I don’t think that’s plausible. Take William Rowe’s recent argument in Notre Dame Phil Reviews

I think Plantinga is entirely correct in holding that God cannot be a contingent being, a being who exists in some possible worlds but does not exist in other possible worlds. For example, should he then happen to exist in the possible world that is actual, it allows us to imagine God bowing down and thanking his lucky stars that one of the worlds in which he exists just happens to be the actual world. Such a possibility represents, in my judgment, a demeaning view of God. There is good reason, therefore, to reject the view that God is a contingent being in the sense that he may exist in some possible worlds but fail to exist in others. On the other hand, an atheist, friendly or unfriendly, cannot rationally agree that God is a necessary being in the sense that he actually exists in every possible world. As a (hopefully possible) way out of this difficulty, I suggest the following conception of God: “God is such that if he exists in any possible world, he exists in every possible world”. I suspect that theists, agnostics, and atheists can accept this proposition. All they then need disagree on is whether God exists in the actual world (the world in which we live and of which we have some direct knowledge). And they may agree on another important point: If he does exist in the actual world, he exists in every possible world; whereas, if he doesn’t exist in the actual world, he exists in no possible world. If the former is true, God may be said to enjoy a sort of necessary existence; whereas, if the latter is true, God fails to exist in any possible world.

The Euthyphro is supposed to function like a reductio ad absurdium, if argues that if you accept a divine command theory then morality is arbitrary. This means that the you start by assuming Adam’s position is true for the sake of argument and arguing from this conclusion. In this context it’s not begging the question to hold the relationship between Gods commands and moral obligations are necessary, in fact unless the argument is a straw man you have to do this.

It doesn’t really assume this. It only assumes that there are worlds in which God does not exist and in which children exist. In such a world, it is still wrong to torture a child. The argument is neutral on the question of whether “Torturing children is wrong” is true in worlds in which children do not exist; and so is neutral on the question of whether moral truths are necessary truths.

“Second, God’s existence is contingent so his non existence is “logically possible”. Most theists would deny the second of these assumptions, theism of the sort advocated by Craig, Adams, Plantinga, and so on typically holds that God necessarily exists.”

They may hold this, but since there is no valid version of the ontological argument, let alone one that proves the existence of a necessarily all-loving deity, it is an unfounded belief. [Aside: I don't think Adams actually holds this. The Adams of "A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness" did not. He thinks it is logically possible, for example, for God to command something gratuitously cruel. But if, as you say, God is necessarily all-loving, a world in which the deity commands gratuitous cruelty is a world in which God does not exist.]

“I don’t think any theist who accepts that God is the creator and sustainer of all beings other than himself would accept that there is a possible world where people can exist uncreated and unstained by God.”

They ought to. After all it is possible that Yod exists; that is it is possible that there is a deity who is the all-powerful, all-knowing, contingently all-loving creator and sustainer. Such a deity would not be God, on your account, since God is necessarily all-loving. Surely Yod can create and sustain a world with people.

[1]’ If Gods commands can be identical with moral obligations so can Azura’s

This seems clearly false, if there is a possible world in which moral obligations are identical with God’s commands then this is true in all possible worlds, so there can be no possible world where Azura’s commands are identical with obligations.

Right, this argument makes two assumptions. First that moral obligations are necessariliy existent and so exist in all possible worlds and Second, God’s existence is contingent so his non existence is “logically possible”.

Most theists would deny the second of these assumptions, theism of the sort advocated by Craig, Adams, Plantinga, and so on typically holds that God necessarily exists.

Moreover, I am inclined to think that any reason someone gave for denying that God if he existed has necessary existence, would be a reason also for thinking moral obligations don’t necessarily exist.

Finally, I would note one might claim that the first assumption is false because its possible that no people exist, and if that’s the case then obligations which are properties of actions would not exist either. To get around this problem you’d have to modify the example so that you were claiming there was a possible world in which people existed but God did not, and I don’t think any theist who accepts that God is the creator and sustainer of all beings other than himself would accept that there is a possible world where people can exist uncreated and unstained by God.

God’s commands cannot be identical to moral obligations. It is logically possible that God does not exist, in which case (assuming DCT) there would be no moral obligations. It would not be wrong to torture children. Since it is logically possible for there to be no divine commands, the commands of God cannot be identified with moral obligations.

(1) If God can create morality, then so can Asura.
(2) There is some possible world in which Asura commands the torture of children
Thus, (3) In that world, the torture of children is morally obligatory.
Thus, (4) There is some world in which the torture of children is morally obligatory.

At least two problems with [1], First, Adam’s view is not that God creates morality, its that moral obligations are identical with the commands of an essentially loving and just God, so [1] should be

[1]’ If Gods commands can be identical with moral obligations so can Azura’s

[1]” however seems to me false, for an obvious reason, there its logically possible for a Azura to command actions which are creul and unjust, and so Azura’s commands cannot be identified with moral obligations. On the other hand there is no possible world in which a loving and just God can command this, and so this objection does not apply to a loving and just God. It seems then that the two cases are not par, a person can have reasons for rejecting one and not the other.

“If you are going to use this move to attack Adams’ reformulation, you have to show that Adams’ position logically commits him to the view that a non-loving being can create morality. If you do not, and you have not, you are begging the question against Adams, for you are assuming what Adams denies in order to “refute” him. ”

II take it as obvious enough that if morality is creatable, then a being that is as powerful as God can create it. And this isn’t begging the question unless we have been given some reason to think that a non-loving being can’t do it. Basically my view is that if you believe that a loving deity can create morality, then there is no reason to suppose that a non-loving being cannot do it. That’s the gist, but I want to add something here:

For any version of the divine command theory, we can ask what happens if it turns out that there is no God. Typically the response is that there would be no morality (or, more specifically in Adams’ case, no moral obligations). But we should also be able to ask what happens if it turns out that God is other than we believe him to be. What happens is God is not all-loving or not essentially all-loving. I don’t see how the divine command theorists gets out of having to conclude that if God is not essentially all-loving, then it is possible (metaphysically) that something horrible like the torture of children is obligatory. The alternative, claiming that if God is not essentially loving, then there are no moral obligations (since such a God cannot create morality) seems like special pleading. There is no reason given to believe that God can only create morality if he is essentially all-loving.

The foregoing shows that I reject Adams’ reformulation. I developed the objections on which I rely after criticizing your post. I have never taken the divine command theory seriously except as an intellectual puzzle. You write:

“My tack was to say that if we are permitted to assume that an all-loving being can create morality, then surely we are permitted to assume that a non-loving being can create morality. Zamulinski has not shown that this is an unreasonable argumentative move.”

If you are going to use this move to attack Adams’ reformulation, you have to show that Adams’ position logically commits him to the view that a non-loving being can create morality. If you do not, and you have not, you are begging the question against Adams, for you are assuming what Adams denies in order to “refute” him.

You are right to question whether Adams has shown how God can create morality. It is necessary to demonstrate both that God exists and morality can be created in order to establish that the divine command theory is true. However, as far as I can tell, what Adams aims to do is to show not that the theory is true but merely that the Euthyphro objection fails, that is, to show that it is still possible that the divine command theory is true.