I recently came across a response to my October post on the Euthyphro Dilemma, which I thought it worth responding to. The response, written by philosopher Brian Zamulinski, was itself written in October, but I missed it until just a few days ago. In it Zamulinski says that my arguments defending the strength of the Euthyphro objection to the divine command theory are unsuccessful:
To repeat, Adam’s reformulated divine command theory is that morality is constituted by the commands of an essentially loving God. Now, if E (for “entity”) essentially possesses P (for “property”), then E possesses P in all possible worlds in which E exists. So, by hypothesis, God is loving in every world in which He exists. God is not just contingently loving, that is, loving in at least one possible world in which He exists
On the basis of an analogy, Thibodeau claims that “we may know with certainty that an all-loving being will not issue a command to torture children, but, given that he is omnipotent, it remains the case that he can issue such a command.” The analogy is to someone who will not but who could jump from the Empire State Building. The analogy is irrelevant because the possible jumper is only a contingent jumper. For the parallel to hold, it must be possible for an essentially non-jumping person to jump. Thus, Thibodeau equivocates between an essentially loving being and a contingently loving being. Thibodeau has a second objection that also fails: it begs the question in that it presupposes that a non-loving being can create morality.
In my original post, I gave two arguments for the conclusion that the Euthyphro Dilemma defeats to the divine command theory (DCT) because it shows that the DCT implies that morality is arbitrary and contingent. My first argument was supposed to show that even an all-loving being is able to make cruel commands, and thus that the DCT implies that it is metaphysically possible that a cruel act such as torturing a child is morally obligatory. The second says, essentially, that even if we thought that an all-loving being cannot command torture, this does not help the DCT since it is possible that there exists a divine commander who enjoys (and commands) cruelty for its own sake. If it is possible that such a being (whom I called Asura) exists, then it is possible that torturing children is morally obligatory. Zamulinski says that both of these arguments fail; the first because I have misunderstood or misinterpreted Adams version of the divine command theory, the second because I have begged the question. In this post I will respond to the second of Zamulinski’s criticisms and I will follow up with a later post that will address his first criticism.
For now what I am particularly interested in is the following statement:
Thibodeau has a second objection that also fails: it begs the question in that it presupposes that a non-loving being can create morality.
This claim strikes me as incredibly odd. Why, if Adams is permitted to assume that an all-loving being can create morality, am I not permitted to assume that a non-loving being can do the same thing? Now, it is true that I actually don’t believe that a non-loving being can create morality, I am assuming it only for the sake of creating a reductio of the divine command theory. But I cannot see that there is any problem with this assumption.
Adams version of the divine command theory assumes something that I believe is false: that an all-loving being can create morality. I believe this is false because I believe that no person, loving or otherwise, could have control over moral facts (that is, have the capacity to change moral facts or to bring them into existence). But I am not and was not trying to make this point. My point was only to draw out the absurd consequences of the divine command theory. My tack was to say that if we are permitted to assume that an all-loving being can create morality, then surely we are permitted to assume that a non-loving being can create morality. Zamulinski has not shown that this is an unreasonable argumentative move.
If we knew how God is able to create morality, then maybe we would be in a position to say that a non-loving being cannot do it (or at least that we are not warranted in supposing that he can). Maybe being all-loving endows God with some special capabilities that a non-all-loving being would not have. But has Adams actually shown how God creates morality? Well, the divine command theory says that God does it by issuing commands. But a non-loving omnipotent being can certainly issue commands. Then is there some reason to believe that the commands of a non-loving being would be ineffective, that they wouldn’t actually create morality even though God’s commands can? If this is what Adams or Zamulinski or anyone else believes, then we need an argument for it. We need to know why it is that being all-loving endows God with the capacity to create morality; we need to know how it works. There is no such argument that I am aware of. As it stands, given that Asura (the evil Creator from my example) is at least as powerful as God, it is reasonable to think that if there is something that God can do, then Asura can do it as well.
The structure of my argument, to which Zamulinski objects, is as follows:
(1) If God can create morality, then so can Asura.
(2) There is some possible world in which Asura commands the torture of children
Thus, (3) In that world, the torture of children is morally obligatory.
Thus, (4) There is some world in which the torture of children is morally obligatory.
Therefore, (5) It is metaphysically possible that the torture of children is morally obligatory.
I cannot see how premise (1) begs the question. The question is not, “Can a non-loving deity create morality?” but “Does the divine command theory have the consequence that morality is arbitrary and contingent?” Remember, Adams modification of the divine command theory was motivated by a need for a reply to the Euthyphro Dilemma, not because it is somehow difficult to believe that a being who is not all loving can create moral properties.
Again, my working assumption is that if there is some feat that God (assuming he exists) can accomplish, then, absent any obvious reason to think otherwise, we are justified in believing that any being that is omnipotent will be able to accomplish the same task. It is worth pointing out, however, that Adams’ God is limited in the things that he can do. According to Zamulinski, God cannot command the torture of children, for example. Thus, a being who is not essentially limited, in the way that Zamulinski, Adams, and Matthew Flannagan all agree that God is, can do more than God can do.
With this in mind, I will now reformulate my argument to explicitly refer to a being who is essentially unlimited rather than to the non-loving being Asura:
Conisder the supernatural being who we’ll call Yod: Yod is the omniscient, omnipotent, all-loving creator. In fact the only way in which Yod differs from God is that Yod is not essentially all-loving. There are worlds in which Yod is all-loving, but there are also worlds in which he is not. Yod is not essentially all-loving because he is omnipotent. Being omnipotent, it is possible for him to do anything, including issue cruel commands, such as that children be tortured. Issuing such a command may entail changing his character traits, but being omnipotent means being unlimited, which in turn entails not being limited by one’s own character traits. Since Yod is omnipotent, he can change his own character. Thus there is no problem in supposing that Yod, even though he is actually all-loving (and thus has not actually commanded the torture of children), can command the torture of children. Since Yod can command torture, there is some possible world in which he does command torture and thus, if the divine command theory is true, there is some possible world in which torturing children is morally obligatory.
Notice that this version of the argument does not assume that a non-loving being can create morality, it assumes that an all-loving being who is not essentially loving can create morality. This is not so far from Adams’ presupposition that an essentially loving being can create morality. And until we have some argument that shows why only an essentially loving being can create morality, if Adams’ presupposition is allowable, mine must be as well.
Notice also that I have claimed that Yod’s being omnipotent requires that he not be essentially loving. This observation, which is the basis of my claim that an omnipotent being is able to command torture, will be expanded and defended in my next post.
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January 25, 2012 at 5:43 am
Brian Zamulinski
It is important to note that I am not defending the divine command theory. Socrates objected that we cannot define morality in terms of the commands of God, because God can command anything at all but not anything at all can be good or right. While I think that the Socratic challenge can be met by Adams’ substitution of the commands of a loving God for the commands of God, there are other problems. If God fails to warn us of any dangers, he is cruel, while if he warns of all dangers, he must warn against cholesterol as well as killing, which means that the definition is too broad and therefore false. Furthermore, if He creates the dangers that He warns against, He is controlling rather than loving. There’s also an insuperable circularity problem. God may never lie but we don’t know that any of His supposed commands represents one of His morality-constituting commands unless we prove independently that it commands something that is good or right.
The foregoing shows that I reject Adams’ reformulation. I developed the objections on which I rely after criticizing your post. I have never taken the divine command theory seriously except as an intellectual puzzle. You write:
“My tack was to say that if we are permitted to assume that an all-loving being can create morality, then surely we are permitted to assume that a non-loving being can create morality. Zamulinski has not shown that this is an unreasonable argumentative move.”
If you are going to use this move to attack Adams’ reformulation, you have to show that Adams’ position logically commits him to the view that a non-loving being can create morality. If you do not, and you have not, you are begging the question against Adams, for you are assuming what Adams denies in order to “refute” him.
You are right to question whether Adams has shown how God can create morality. It is necessary to demonstrate both that God exists and morality can be created in order to establish that the divine command theory is true. However, as far as I can tell, what Adams aims to do is to show not that the theory is true but merely that the Euthyphro objection fails, that is, to show that it is still possible that the divine command theory is true.
January 25, 2012 at 10:57 am
jbthibodeau
Brian,
It’s true that I should have pointed out that you reject the divine command theory (for reasons other than the Euthyphro problem). I’ll correct the omission in my next post.
“If you are going to use this move to attack Adams’ reformulation, you have to show that Adams’ position logically commits him to the view that a non-loving being can create morality. If you do not, and you have not, you are begging the question against Adams, for you are assuming what Adams denies in order to “refute” him. ”
II take it as obvious enough that if morality is creatable, then a being that is as powerful as God can create it. And this isn’t begging the question unless we have been given some reason to think that a non-loving being can’t do it. Basically my view is that if you believe that a loving deity can create morality, then there is no reason to suppose that a non-loving being cannot do it. That’s the gist, but I want to add something here:
For any version of the divine command theory, we can ask what happens if it turns out that there is no God. Typically the response is that there would be no morality (or, more specifically in Adams’ case, no moral obligations). But we should also be able to ask what happens if it turns out that God is other than we believe him to be. What happens is God is not all-loving or not essentially all-loving. I don’t see how the divine command theorists gets out of having to conclude that if God is not essentially all-loving, then it is possible (metaphysically) that something horrible like the torture of children is obligatory. The alternative, claiming that if God is not essentially loving, then there are no moral obligations (since such a God cannot create morality) seems like special pleading. There is no reason given to believe that God can only create morality if he is essentially all-loving.
February 4, 2012 at 2:36 am
Matthew Flannagan
Jason, your argument is:
(1) If God can create morality, then so can Asura.
(2) There is some possible world in which Asura commands the torture of children
Thus, (3) In that world, the torture of children is morally obligatory.
Thus, (4) There is some world in which the torture of children is morally obligatory.
At least two problems with [1], First, Adam’s view is not that God creates morality, its that moral obligations are identical with the commands of an essentially loving and just God, so [1] should be
[1]’ If Gods commands can be identical with moral obligations so can Azura’s
[1]” however seems to me false, for an obvious reason, there its logically possible for a Azura to command actions which are creul and unjust, and so Azura’s commands cannot be identified with moral obligations. On the other hand there is no possible world in which a loving and just God can command this, and so this objection does not apply to a loving and just God. It seems then that the two cases are not par, a person can have reasons for rejecting one and not the other.
February 4, 2012 at 4:17 pm
jbthibodeau
Matt,
Why, then, cannot I not reason as follows:
God’s commands cannot be identical to moral obligations. It is logically possible that God does not exist, in which case (assuming DCT) there would be no moral obligations. It would not be wrong to torture children. Since it is logically possible for there to be no divine commands, the commands of God cannot be identified with moral obligations.
February 5, 2012 at 12:03 am
Matthew Flannagan
“God’s commands cannot be identical to moral obligations. It is logically possible that God does not exist, in which case (assuming DCT) there would be no moral obligations. It would not be wrong to torture children. Since it is logically possible for there to be no divine commands, the commands of God cannot be identified with moral obligations.”
Right, this argument makes two assumptions. First that moral obligations are necessariliy existent and so exist in all possible worlds and Second, God’s existence is contingent so his non existence is “logically possible”.
Most theists would deny the second of these assumptions, theism of the sort advocated by Craig, Adams, Plantinga, and so on typically holds that God necessarily exists.
Moreover, I am inclined to think that any reason someone gave for denying that God if he existed has necessary existence, would be a reason also for thinking moral obligations don’t necessarily exist.
Finally, I would note one might claim that the first assumption is false because its possible that no people exist, and if that’s the case then obligations which are properties of actions would not exist either. To get around this problem you’d have to modify the example so that you were claiming there was a possible world in which people existed but God did not, and I don’t think any theist who accepts that God is the creator and sustainer of all beings other than himself would accept that there is a possible world where people can exist uncreated and unstained by God.
February 5, 2012 at 5:04 am
jbthibodeau
“Right, this argument makes two assumptions. First that moral obligations are necessariliy existent and so exist in all possible worlds”
It doesn’t really assume this. It only assumes that there are worlds in which God does not exist and in which children exist. In such a world, it is still wrong to torture a child. The argument is neutral on the question of whether “Torturing children is wrong” is true in worlds in which children do not exist; and so is neutral on the question of whether moral truths are necessary truths.
“Second, God’s existence is contingent so his non existence is “logically possible”. Most theists would deny the second of these assumptions, theism of the sort advocated by Craig, Adams, Plantinga, and so on typically holds that God necessarily exists.”
They may hold this, but since there is no valid version of the ontological argument, let alone one that proves the existence of a necessarily all-loving deity, it is an unfounded belief. [Aside: I don't think Adams actually holds this. The Adams of "A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness" did not. He thinks it is logically possible, for example, for God to command something gratuitously cruel. But if, as you say, God is necessarily all-loving, a world in which the deity commands gratuitous cruelty is a world in which God does not exist.]
“I don’t think any theist who accepts that God is the creator and sustainer of all beings other than himself would accept that there is a possible world where people can exist uncreated and unstained by God.”
They ought to. After all it is possible that Yod exists; that is it is possible that there is a deity who is the all-powerful, all-knowing, contingently all-loving creator and sustainer. Such a deity would not be God, on your account, since God is necessarily all-loving. Surely Yod can create and sustain a world with people.
February 6, 2012 at 7:35 pm
Matthew Flannagan
Jason,
Yes, but in his book Finite and Infinite Goods he seems to say he does accept Gods existence is necessary. Though he does not want to rely on this claim dialectically.
That assumes the only reason for saying that if God exists he would have the property of existing necessarily is that the ontological argument is valid. I don’t think that’s plausible. Take William Rowe’s recent argument in Notre Dame Phil Reviews
February 5, 2012 at 12:09 am
Matthew Flannagan
[1] also seems problematic for another reason. identity relationships are necessary relationships, if X is identical to Y that is a necessary truth. So now consider
[1]’ If Gods commands can be identical with moral obligations so can Azura’s
This seems clearly false, if there is a possible world in which moral obligations are identical with God’s commands then this is true in all possible worlds, so there can be no possible world where Azura’s commands are identical with obligations.
February 5, 2012 at 4:45 am
jbthibodeau
Identity relationships may be necessary but not all identity statements are necessary.
‘Mt. Everest is identical to the tallest mountain in the world’ is not a necessary truth.
Kripke’s point was that identity statements that involve rigid designators are necessary. Since the Euthyphro objection is, in essence, an argument that ‘God’s commands’ is not a rigid designator, to assume otherwise is to beg the question.
February 6, 2012 at 7:18 pm
Matthew Flannagan
Jason, Adam’s is quite clear that he intends his claim that moral obligations are identified with the commands of a loving and just God to be necessarily true. Craig and Quinn make similar claims.
The Euthyphro is supposed to function like a reductio ad absurdium, if argues that if you accept a divine command theory then morality is arbitrary. This means that the you start by assuming Adam’s position is true for the sake of argument and arguing from this conclusion. In this context it’s not begging the question to hold the relationship between Gods commands and moral obligations are necessary, in fact unless the argument is a straw man you have to do this.